

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 BRASILIA 1377

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY), BR
SUBJ: PREPARATION FOR PRESIDENTS VISIT

REF: STATE 45578

1. WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENTS VISIT, AND HOPE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WILL BE USEFUL DESPITE THE TIGHTNESS OF THE DEADLINE ESTABLISHED FOR THIER SUBMISSION. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THIS MESSAGE WERE DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADOR WHO, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF HIS IMMINENT DEPARTURE FROM BRASILIA, DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DRAFTING.

2. WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH PARA 2 OF REFTTEL. WE WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS:

A. WHEN THE PRESIDENT ARRIVES IN BRASILIA, THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE JUST UNDER ONE YEAR TO GO. GEISEL HAS ALREADY DESIGNATED HIS SUCCESSOR, WHOSE "CANDIDACY" WILL BE FORMALIZED BY THE ARENA NOMINATING CONVENTION IN EARLY APRIL. POLITICAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION IS EVEN NOW FOCUSING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON SUCCESSION (FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL) AND ON THE POSSIBLE CONTENT AND SCOPE OF CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATION THAT, IS IS HOPED, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH WILL
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PROVIDE FOR A GRADUAL BUT STEADY INCREASE IN POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL DECISIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, 1978 IS ALREADY VERY MUCH A POLITICAL YEAR, AND EVENTS SUCH AS THE PRESIDENTS VISIT WILL BE IMBUED WITH HIGH POLITICAL CONTEN (ILLUSTRATIVE OF THIS IS THE NET PUBLIC AND POLITICAL EXPECTATION-- AS EXPRESSED PRIVATELY TO US AND IN THE PRESS--THAT THE IMMINENT CHANGE OF US AMBASSADORS TO BRAZIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

PRESAGES A FORTHCOMING CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARD BRAZIL, I.E., A US POSTURE MORE ACCOMODATING OF BRAZILIAN INTERESTS.) ADDED TO THIS MUST BE GEISEL'S AUTHORITARIAN, DIDACTIC PERSONALITY, HIS KEEN SENSE OF HIS PLACE IN HISTORY, AND THE ALREADY ACCELERATED PACE OF HIS CONDUCT OF BRAZIL'S INTERNAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS SO AS TO ACCOMPLISH AS MUCH OF HIS PROGRAM AS POSSIBLE IN THE TIME LEFT TO HIM.

B. THIS COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND PERSONALITY ARGUES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS UNLIKELY TO ENGENDER ANY APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN THE LONG-HELD BRAZILIAN POSITIONS ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US. WE BELIEVE, IN FACT, THAT GEISEL MEANT TO CONVEY SUCH A MESSAGE TO US IN HIS JANUARY 18 PRESS CONFERENCE IN MEXICO CITY, IN WHICH HE WAS UNUSUALLY ARTICULATE IN RESTATING BRAZILIAN POSITIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS NUCLEAR POLICY, AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. SEE BRASILIA 0925. HIS COMING VISIT TO WEST GERMANY SHOULD BE WATCHED CAREFULLY FOR SIMILAR MANIFESTATIONS OF INFLEXIBILITY.

C. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION ALSO INHIBITS GOB RECEPTIVITY TO US CONCERNS. SADDLED WITH A LARGE EXTERNAL DEBT, BRAZIL MUST ACHIEVE A TRADE SURPLUS; THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL'S EXTERNAL TRADE THIS YEAR IS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY AS A RESULT OF DROUGH CONDITIONS IN MAJOR AGRICULTURE REGIONS AND FALLING WORLD PRICES FOR BRAZIL'S PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. GROWTH IN EXPORTS IS PROJECTED TO BE THE LOWEST IN A DECADE. ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE RESTRICTIVE MONETARY FISCAL POLICY, WHILE SACRIFICING SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH, HAS TO DATE PRODUCED

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ONLY LIMITED PAY-OFF INTERMS OF REDUCED INFLATION. THESE PROBLEMS-- EXTERNAL DEBT ACCUMULATION AND DOMESTIC INFLATION--IN FACT HAVE PRODUCED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: SENIOR ECONOMIC POLICY OFFICIALS NOW CONCEDE THAT FOR SOME (UNSPECIFIED) TIME TO COME BRAZIL MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT A REDUCED RATE OF GROWTH.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (7 SECTIONS VICE 6)

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN OVER THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
LOWER GROWTH.

D. OUR JUDGEMENT THAT GEISEL IS NOT LIKELY TO MOVE AWAY
FROM STRONGLY HELD POSITIONS IS FURTHER REINFORCED
BY WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE A GOB DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCE
AND SUBSTANCE OF "NEUTRAL" STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE DEVELOPED
WORLD AS TO RETAIN MAXIMUM POSSIBLE G-77 SUPPORT ON
ISSUES OF INTEREST TO BRAZIL IN WORLD COUNCILS.

E. WE AGREE THOROUGHLY ON THE NEED TO AVOID THOSE PITFALLS
SPELLED OUT IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH SENTENCES OF PARA 2 REFTTEL,
AND WOULD ADD THAT SOME MININTERPRETATION IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT
TO AVOID. THE NEED TO GUARD AGAINST THIS ARGUES FOR STRAIGHT-
FORWARD PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF OUR POSITIONS AND TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF OPPORTUNITIES TO STATE OUR VIEWS IN NON-PROVOCATIVE AND
WAYS, AND UNDERLINES THE DESIRABILITY
OF A PRESS CONFERENCE DURING THE VISIT (SEE BRASILIA 1277).
AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, WE ENVISAGE THE CONGRESS AS THE
PRINCIPAL FORUM IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS
AND EXPRESS OUR THOUGHTS ON ISSUES THAT ARE BOTH DIVEREGENT
AND CONVERGENT WITH BRAZIL'S. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE
DESIRABILITY OF STATING OUR POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES,
E.G., HUMAN RIGHTS, NUCLEAR POLICY, IN NON-CONFRONTATIONAL
TERMS, (E.E., CASTING THEM IN TERMS OF OUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND
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PRACTICE) ARGUES FOR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF OTHER FORUMS AS WELL.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SPECIFICALLY AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND ONCE
AGAIN (SEE BRASILIA 12775 THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A
BRIEF PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCE AT THE SUPREME FEDERAL TRIBUNAL.
IN ADDITION TO THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SUCH AN APPEARANCE
THAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY ADDUCED, WE WOULD NOTE THAT PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVE NO. 30 ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF FEBRUARY 17, 1978 STATE
45685, IN ITS SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, CHARGES THE UNITED STATES,
IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WITH THE USE OF "THE FULL
RANGE OF ITS DIPLOMATIC TOOLS, INCLUDING... SYMBOLIC ACTS".
IN TERMS OF THE LIVELY AND WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DEBATE GOING ON
IN BRAZIL OVER THE FORM IN WHICH THE NATION MAY EVENTUALLY
RETURN TO A STATE OF LAW, THIS WOULD BE A MOST APPROPRIATE
SYMBOLIC ACT BY WHICH TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND--ALTHOUGH BY
INDIRECTION--ENCOURAGE THE POLITICAL PROCESS NOW TAKING PLACE.

F. ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, OUR POSITION SHOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE STATED CLEARLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A CLEAR NEED FOR A REINFORCING STATEMENT, AS IT WERE, TO THE PRESS. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL ASPECT OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, ON OUR OWN NON-PROLIFERATION PRACTICES, AND ON OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT VERTICAL AS WELL AS HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION (A FAVORITE THEME WITH THE GOB). MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE PRESIDENT IN THIS FORUM COULD, WE BELIEVE, ADDRESS THE WIDESPREAD BRAZILIAN SUSPICION THAT OUR NUCLEAR POLICY IS AIMED ULTIMATELY AT PREVENTING BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR ENERGY ALTERNATIVE, SO AS TO RETARD HER GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT INTO A MAJOR POWER THAT WOULD COME INTO SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND OTHER COMPETITION WITH US IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

G. WE BELIEVE (WITH THE DEPARTMENT) THE THE PRESIDENTS VISIT SHOULD BE CAST IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RECOGNITION OF BRAZIL'S GROWING WORLD ROLE. AS THE EMBASSY HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD GO BEYOND THIS AND

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APY DISCREET HOMAGE TO BRAZIL'S DESIRE TO HAVE IT SPECIFIC WEIGHT IN THE WORLD RECOGNIZED BY THE POWER (THE US) TOWARD WHICH IT FEELS MOST AMBIVALENT BUT WHICH IT MOST WISHES TO EMULATE. WE SHOULD THUS NOT ONLY RECOGNIZE BUT WELCOME BRAZIL'S GROWING WORLD ROLE, ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF BRAZIL'S ASPIRATIONS TO MAJOR POWER STATUS, AND EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR THESE ASPIRATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE ALSO CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED, WE BELIEVE THAT ESSENTIAL (AGAIN DISCREETLY) TO REMIND OUR BRAZILIAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT GROWING POWER ENTAILS GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THAT WE BOTH RECOGNIZE AND ENCOURAGE BRAZIL'S STRONG WISH TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE WORLD POWER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH HER AS A RESPONSIBLE, CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE PARTICIPANT IN THAT PROCESS.

H. BEFORE PROCEEDING TO SPECIFICS (PARA 3 AND FOLLOWING OF REFTEL), WE WOULD SUGGEST:

I. IN TREATING OUR DIVERGENCES WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID THE SUGGESTION OR THE APPEARANCE THAT WE DIFFER WITH BRAZIL OUT OF CONCERN OVER HER GROWING POWER, CONVERSELY, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID EXPRESSING UNDUE INTEREST IN AREAS WHICH BRAZIL GUARDS ZEALOUSLY OUT OF CONCERN OVER IMAGINED REPACIOUSNESS ON OUR PART. THE AMAZON BASIN IS A PRIME ILLUSTRATION OF THIS BRAZILIAN CONCERN.

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II. WE SHOULD AT APPROPRIATE POINTS NOTE BOTH THE COMPLEXITY AND THE LARGE VOLUME OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THE PARALLELLISM WITH WHICH WE APPROACH NUMEROUS ISSUES IN WORLD AND REGIONAL COUNCILS, AS WELL AS FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGING OUR DIFFERENCES.

III. WE THOROUGHLY AGREE THAT WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE THAT BRAZIL IS OUR "CHOSEN" INSTRUMENT IN THE HEMISPHERE. WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT WAS SHOULD, IN FACT, TREAT BRAZIL DURING THE VISIT OUTSIDE OF A SPECIFIC HIMISPHERIC CONTEXT. ON WAY THIS COULD BE DONE WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO USE BRAZIL AS A PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO DELIVER A STATEMENT ABOUT US ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICY TOWARDS THE LDC'S AND "YOUNG" COMING WORLD POWERS, THE EVOLVING ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WITHIN THIS BROADER GLOBAL CONTEXT, HE COULD THEN SPEAK OF "GRANDEZA" AND US ATTITUDES TOWARD BRAZILIAN ASPIRATIONS.

3. A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A NEL EXPANDED S&T AGREEMENT IS THE KEY TO INCREASING TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE GOB. THE S&T BILATERAL, AS REVISED IN 1976N ALREADY PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE UMBRALLA FOR SCIENTIFICN TECHNOLOGICAL, AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OUR TWO BILATERAL SUB-GROUPS IN THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION SPHERE HAVE LANGUISHED FOR WANT OF INTEREST AND RESOURCES ON BOTH SIDES, AND UNLESS WASHINGTON CAN FIND A FORMULA FOR ALUNCHING CONCRETE COOPERATION PROJECTS
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WHICH WOULD GIVE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN THIS SPHERE LASTING MOMENTUM, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTEL POINT IN SIGNING YET ANOTHER AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SEE POSSIBILITIES OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE WHICH WE RECOMMMENT BE EXPLORED FURTHER WITH THE GOB (BRASILIAS 1176). THE NEW BRAZILIAN MODEL JOINT-VENTURE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD

COVER FUTURE SHRIMP FISHING INCLUDES PORTIONS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO OUR SIDE. AFTER HEARING OUR OBJECTIONS, THE BRAZILIAN SIDE SUSPENDED THE TALKS SINE DIE, AND THERE IS NO ASSURANCE WHATSOEVER THAT THE GAP IN OUR POSITIONS COULD BE NARROWED IN TIME FOR SIGNING BY THE END OF MARCH. IN ANY CASE, THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF SUCH LIMITED SCOPE THAT WE QUESTION ITS SUITABILITY FOR CEREMONIAL, PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL SIGNING.

B. AS REGARDS COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE, THE PRESIDENT, DURING THE DISCUSSION OF GLOBAL ISSUES, MAY WISH TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF WORLD FOOD SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STRESS THAT THE US WELCOMES BRAZILS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS EFFORTS, BOTH AS A CONTRIBUTION TO BRAZILS OWN DEVELOPMENT AND TO THE SOLUTION OF THE LARGER WORLD FOOD PROBLEM. IN CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT STATE THAT THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PURSUING TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH BRAZIL IF THE GOB SO WISHES.

4. THE MATTER OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WILL BE ADDRESSED BY SEPTEL.

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EXDIS

5. COMMENTS ON PARA 5 OF REFTEL.

A. BRAZIL'S GLOBAL ROLE AND OUR SHARED INTERESTS.

(I) WE QUESTION THE CONCEPT THAT BRAZIL'S EMERGENCE IS INEVITABLY ACCOMPANIED BY STRESS. WE AGREE, OF COURSE, THAT ONE RESULT OF BRAZIL'S RISE IS INCREASED COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS IN MANY AREAS, WHICH-- BY OUR OWN NATIONAL IDEALS--WE SHOULD WELCOME. REGARDLESS OF ITS VALIDITY, THE CONCEPT OF INEVITABLE STRESS SUGGESTS A BASIC INCOMPATIBILITY IN BRAZILIAN ASPIRATIONS

AND US INTERESTS, THUS FEEDING BRAZILIAN SUSPICIONS THAT THE US IS FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO BRAZIL'S RISE AND WISHES TO PLACE OBSTACLES IN ITS COURSE. FOR THIS REASON, WE BELIEVE THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE AND PUBLIC UTTERANCES.

(II) AS REGARDS BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE PRESIDENT NOT OVER-STATE BRAZIL'S SUCCESS. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY FACES A VERY UNCERTAIN YEAR, AND IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IT IS NOW GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT FOR AN INDETERMINED PERIOD BRAZIL MUST ACCEPT A LOWER GROWTH PATH. OVER-STATEMENT OF BRAZILIAN PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESS AROUSES BRAZILIAN SUSPICION THAT THE US HAS ULTERIOR SELF-SERVING PURPOSES, THAT IT IS TRYING TO COOPT BRAZIL INTO THE DC CAMPT, CONFIDENTIAL

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OR THAT THE US SIMPLY DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BRAZILIAN REALITY--SUSPICIONS WHICH REFLECT BRAZIL'S HIGHLY UNEVEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND ULTIMATE UNCERTAINTY WHETHER THE COUNTRY WILL IN FACT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES OF A DEVELOPED SOCIETY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

(III) WE ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF FREQUENT HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON GLOBAL ISSUES, AND SUCH ISSUES SHOULD BE ON THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS REAFFIRM THE USE OF EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS ON THIS RANGE OF ISSUES. WE SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, EXPECT QUICK AND EASY RESULTS. FREQUENTLY, THE GOB WILL PERCEIVE ITS INTERESTS AS DIFFERENT FROM OURS; EVEN WHEN IT DOES NOT, THE GOB WILL BE UNWILLING TO BREAK RANKS OPENLY WITH THE G-77. DESIRING TO RETAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY OR TO AVOID EVENTUALLY BEING BOXED INTO A POSITION OF CONFLICT WITH G-77 COUNTRIES, GOB SPOKESMEN ARE OFTEN QUITE RETICENT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH US OF UPCOMING WORLD ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CARRY FORWARD THIS EFFORT FOR ITS LONG-RANGE EDUCATIONAL EFFECT.

(IV) THE PARTICULAR SUBJECTS SUGGESTED IN PARA 5-A ARE USEFUL. GEISEL WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON GLOBAL ECONOMIC TRENDS, THE PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING THE OPEC PRICE FREEZE, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA (SOUTHERN AFRICA; CUBAN PRESENCE, ON WHICH GEISEL SPOKE OUT IN MEXICO CITY; AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN). WE WOULD ADD TO THIS LIST AN OVERVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION AND OF STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ON MOST OF THESE ISSUES, WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT ENDORSEMENT OF OUR POSITIONS AND CONCERNS IN THE COMMUNIQUE, ALTHOUGH BRAZILIAN RECEPTIVITY

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SHOULD BE TESTED CASE-BY-CASE.

B. NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES.

WE AGREE THAT THE GENEVA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICIES ARE THOSE OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THE GOB.

(I) MTN

PRESIDENT GEISEL MET RECENTLY WITH HIS ECONOMIC MINISTERS TO REVIEW AND APPROVE BRAZIL'S MTN GOALS AND STRATEGIES AND THUS WILL BE WELL PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THIS RANGE OF ISSUES. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS FALLEN OFF CONSIDERABLY IN THE PAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH BRAZIL'S OBJECTIVE--S&D TREATMENT FOR LDC'S WITH AS FEW CONCESSIONS ON ITS PART AS POSSIBLE--REMAIN THE SAME. BRAZILIAN SUSPICIONS OF DC INTENTIONS IN THE MTN APPARENTLY WERE FURTHER AROUSED BY THE US-EEC AGREEMENT IN THE AGRICULTURAL GROUP, WHICH GOB TRADE OFFICIALS SEE AS A RETREAT TO A TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF NEGOTIATIONS. BRAZIL HAS RECENTLY TABLED IN GENEVA REQUEST LISTS IN THE TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF AREAS. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO REPORTING FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE, THE CURRENT BRAZILIAN TACTIC (AS APPROVED BY GEISEL) IS TO MAKE ONLY NON-COMMITTAL RESPONSES TO THE REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO BRAZIL. IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, BRAZIL HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN A CODE ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES. THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO REVIEW WITH GEISEL THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE VISIT AND US VIEWS ON THEIR PROSPECTIVE COURSE. HE SHOULD OUTLINE OUR THINKING ON S AND D TREATMENT FOR LDC'S WHILE STRESSING OUR CONCERN FOR SOME RECIPROCITY. THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ALSO OFFER TO SEND A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE--IF

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POSSIBLE, AMBASSADOR STRAUSS--TO BRASILIA TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS OF THE GOB THE ENTIRE PACKAGE AS AND WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ENTER THEIR CRITICAL STAGE. IN THE COMMUNIQUE WE SHOULD WORK FOR A JOINT EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN RESISTING PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN THE WORLD, WITH THE US SIDE CITING RECENT US EFFORTS TO AVOID RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES AND TO SUPPORT A LIBERAL TRADING SYSTEM.

(II) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL QUESTIONS.

PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD NOTE THE VERY IMPORTANT ROLE OF US BANKS IN FINANCING BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT YEARS, AND THAT, DESPITE BRAZIL'S CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS, WE RECONGIZE THAT BRAZIL'S FINANCING NEEDS WILL REMAIN LARGE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. AS REPORTED BY THE EMBASSY THERE IS SIGNIFICANT CONCERN IN BRAZIL, AS A RESULT OF VARIOUS TECHNICAL MEASURES TAKEN BY US AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS STATEMENTS IN THE US CONGRESS, THAT THE OFFICIAL US ATTITUDE TOWARD OVERSEAS LENDING OPERATIONS OF US BANKS MAY BECOMING MORE RESTRICTIVE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, THEREFORE, IF THE PRESIDENT COULD REASSURE GEISEL THAT THE US APPROVES OF THE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US BANKS AND BRAZILIAN ENTREPRENEURS AND FULLY SUPPORTS CONTINUING BRAZILIAN ACCESS TO US PRIVATE FINANCIAL RESOURCES. THE TWO PRESIDENTS SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO EXPRESS THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, NOTING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE US IS STILL THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTOR TO THOSE INSTITUTIONS AND THE BRAZIL IS THE LARGEST BORROWER. THE COMMUNIQUE COULD NOTE BRAZIL'S CONTRIBUTION OF HARD CURRENCY TO THE SOFT WINDS OF THE IDB IN THE LAST REPLENISHMENT AND FORESEE FURTHER STEPS BY BRAZIL TOWARD ASSUMING A DONOR ROLE VIS-A-VIS POORER NATIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE. (IF POSSIBLE, IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO HAVE BRAZIL ANNOUNCE ITS APPROVAL OF THE IMF'S SIXTH QUOTA INCREASE, AMENDMENT OF THE IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE WITTEVEEN FACILITY, AND EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE DEMENSIONS OF A SEVENTH QUOTA INCREASE.) FINALLY, THE TWO PRESIDENTS SHOULD NOTE THE EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TREASURY AND THE BRAZILIAN FINANCE MINISTRY. TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THESE RELATIONSHIPS WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL COULD MAKE A VISIT SOME TIME

LATER THIS YEAR TO BRAZIL AND IF THE PRESIDENT COULD MENTION
TO GEISEL THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A VISIT.

(III) COMMUN FUND

PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS FIRST UN ADDRESS INDICATED THE US
FAVORABLE TO THE CREATION OF A COMMON FUND FOR COMMODITIES.
AN EXCHANGE ON THIS ISSUE WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
PRESIDENT TO BE FORTHCOMING ON AN IMPORTANT NORTH/SOUTH ISSUE,
SEEK GEISEL'S COUNSEL AND ADVICE (AND THEREBY PERHAPS OBTAIN
A BIT MORE BRAZILIAN COOPERATION), AND TOUCH AN AMBIVALENT
GOB NERVE IN SUCH A WAY THAT A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE MIGHT
POSSIBLY DEVELOP ON THIS AND OTHER G-77 POSITIONS. IN DISCUSSING
THIS ISSUE, THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO NOTE THAT THE US WILL
CONTINUE TO HOLD TO ITS POSITION THAT THE FINANCING OF THE COMMON
FUND SHOULD BE THROUGH THE POLLING OF RESOURCES FROM THE
INDIVIDUAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, BUT THAT THE US MIGHT BE WILLING
TO FIND SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE G-77 POSITION ON "OTHER MEASURES"
SUCH AS A SECOND WINDOW FOR DEVELOPMENT LENDING FOR COMMODITY-
RELATED PURPOSES. GEISEL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SUFFICIENCY
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OR EVEN APPROPRIATENESS OF SUCH AN ACCOMMODATION ON OUR PART
MIGHT BE SOLICITED. FINALLY, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ASK GEISEL
WHAT THE GOB'S LONGER-TERM VIEW OF THE COMMON FUND IS: WHETHER
IT WOULD PREFER THAT THERE BE AN INDEFINITE, OR EVEN PERMANENT,
DELAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON FUND; OR WHETHER
BRAZILIAN HESITANCY WAS RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF
CERTAIN COMMODITIES WHERE THE GOB HAS NOT SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT
OF BUFFER STOCKS OR OTHER STABILIZATION MEASURES IN THE
PAST.

C. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

I. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK TO MAINTAIN THE TONE OF
SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT IN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE
DISCUSSIONS -- I.E., THAT WE REITERATE OUR SUBSTANTIVE AND
TECHNICAL POSITIONS ON PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, DEMONSTRATE THE
CONSISTENCY OF OUR OWN ACTIONS WITH OUR STATED POSITIONS,
AND EMPHASIZE THAT OUR APPLICATION OF THIS POLICY TO OTHERS
WILL BE NON-DISCRIMINATORY. WE SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE NOT
SEEKING TO FORCE CHANGES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OR DAMAGE NATIONAL

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NUCLEAR PROGRAMS BUT RATHER ARE AIMING AT CONVINCING AND INDUCING OTHER NATIONS TO MODIFY THEIR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERA (INFCE, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCES, ETC.) APPROACHES. THIS IS THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH WE DISCUSSSS WITH THE GOB OUR INTEREST IN OBTAINING GOB AGREEMENT TO DEFER THE INSTALLATION OF THE PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT.

II. AS THE DEPT. IS AWARE, THE ISSUE OF THE EXPORT LICENSE FOR ANGRA I FUEL IS STILL UNRESOLVED. WE BELIEVE IT OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO THE TONE AND ATOMOSPHERE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT THAT THE LICENSE BE ISSUED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THE DECISION BE COMMUNICATED TO THE GOB NO LATER THAN EARLY MARCH IF THERE ARE NO CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE LICENSE. IF THERE ARE CONDITIONS, E.G., NRC INSISTENCE ON A REPROCESSING VETO, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO MENTION THE NEED FOR CONDITIONS TO PRESIDENT GEISEL AND SUGGEST TECHNICAL LEVEL FOLLOW-UP TALKS. IF THERE IS NO DECISION BY THE NRC BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, WE THINK IT BEST THAT THE PRESIDENT BRIEFLY REFER TO THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY.

THE GOB SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEARLY AWARE DURING THE VISIT THAT FUTURE US NUCLEAR COOPERATION DEPENDS
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ON THE GOB IMPLEMENTING FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, UNDER SOME FORMAT, WITHIN TWO YEARS AT MOST. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE SHOULD SEEK TO EXPLORE HOW WE COULD WORK WITH THE GOB TO BRING THE TLAELOLCO TREATY INTO EFFECTIVE FORCE WITHIN THAT TIMEFRAME.

III. WE ARE CURRENTLY WAITING FOR SILVEIRA'S OR UEKI'S RESPONSE, NOT PRESIDENT GEISEL'S, TO THE THORIUM PROPOSAL. WE SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT A RESPONSE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE GEISEL'S VISIT TO BONN. FOR THIS REASON, THE EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD

MAKE A FURTHER REQUEST FOR A RESPONSE IN PREPARATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. (SEE ALSO SEPTEL ON CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR ISSUE: BRASILIA'S 1353.)

C. NON-CONVENTIONAL ENERGY PACKAGE

RATHER THAN A BROAD PROGRAM OF COOPERATION IN NON-CONVENTIONAL ENERGY R AND D, WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSALS SHOULD FOCUS ON SPECIFIC GOB NEEDS AND INTERESTS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCH A PROPOSAL. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ONE GOB RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET SITUATION IS A MASSIVE NATIONAL PROGRAM TO SUBSTITUTE ETHYL ALCOHOL, DERIVED FROM SOLAR ENERGY, FOR PETROLEUM. AT PRESENT, COOPERATION IN NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY IS LIMITED BY:

I. THE ANTAGONISM AROUSED IN THE GOB, WHICH LINKS NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR MATTERS, BY OUR NUCLEAR DIFFERENCES.

II. THE FACT THAT THE GOB TECHNICAL AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS ARE IN TERMS OF GOB FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL RELATIVELY "SATURATED" WITH COOPERATION WITH OTHER (THIRD) COUNTRIES. COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEANS IS IN FACT SUBSIDIZED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
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AND LINKED TO SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OF BOTH BRAZIL AND THE OTHER PARTY.

III. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE US HAS ANY UNIQUE (I.E., NOT OFFERED BY PRESENT COOPERATION PARTNERS) THINGS TO OFFER WHICH MATCH HIGHER PRIORITY GOB INTERESTS IN THE ENERGY AREA.

IV. IN 1977 THE PROBLEM ON THE US SIDE WAS TO OFFER "MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL" COOPERATION FOR WHICH THE US AGENCY HAD IDENTIFIED FUNDS. TO COMPETE WITH THE EUROPEANS, WE BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUBSIDIZED COOPERATION AIMED AT SPECIFIC GAPS IN THE PRESENT GOB INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.

V. GIVEN THE BRAZILIAN ENERGY SITUATION AND THE EFFORTS THE GOB IS MAKING TO DEAL WITH IT, THE MOST CRITICAL GOB NEEDS ARE NOT FOR COOPERATION IN R AND D BUT FOR LOANS, INVESTMENTS, AND JOINT VENTURES TO ASSIST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOB PROGRAMS -- E.G., BIOCONVERSION OF SOLAR ENERGY TO ETHYL ALCOHOL ON A SCALE SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE NEED FOR IMPORTED PETROLEUM IN TRANSPORT USES, INCORPORATION OF MORE REMOTE HYDROPOWER SOURCES INTO THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND PROCESSING OF MINED OIL SHALE IN SURFACE PLANTS. (IF THE FIRST TWO PROGRAMS ARE SUCCESSFUL, BRAZIL WILL BECOME AND REMAIN FOR MANY YEARS THE COUNTRY

IN THE WORLD WITH THE LARGEST FRACTION OF ITS ENERGY
SUPPLY DERIVED FROM RENEWABLE SOLAR ENERGY.)
VI. THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY R AND D
COOPERATION ARE GREATEST IN THE AREAS OF UTILIZA-
TION OF COAL (UPGRADING, GASIFICATION, SYNTHETIC

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FUELS, ETC.), ENERGY CONSERVATION, IN-SITU EXTRACTION
OF OIL FROM SHALE, UTILIZATION OF REMOTE HYDROPOWER
SITES FOR NON-ELECTRICITY ENDS, ENERGY STORAGE,
ELECTRIC-POWERED TRANSPORT, UTILIZATION OF WOOD,
PROCESS HEAT SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION OF URBAN AND
RURAL WASTES. OTHER NON-CONVENTIONAL ENERGY AREAS
SUCH AS SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING, SOLAR ELECTRIC
GENERATION, WIND OR WAVE ENERGY, OCEAN THERMAL
ENERGY CONVERSION, ETC., ARE OF LESSER AND LONGER-
RANGE INTEREST TO THE GOB.

E. HUMAN RIGHTS

WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS
IN THIS AREA IN TERMS OF PRIVATE TREATMENT OF THE
ISSUE. WE WOULD SUGGEST, THOUGH, THAT IN NOTING IMPROVEMENTS
HERE THE PRESIDENT BEAR IN MIND THAT GEISEL STILL SEEMS TO BE
HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH POLICE AUTHORITIES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL,
AND THAT HE ASK GEISEL WHAT SUCCESS HE IS HAVING IN
DEALING WITH THAT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, WITH

REGARD TO PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE,
WE WILL BE FORWARDING SUGGESTIONS WITH OUR CONTRI-
BUTION TO THE STATEMENT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE MAKING
HERE AND WITH OUR RECOMMENDED RESPONSES TO PRESS
QUERIES. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THE HUMAN

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RIGHTS ISSUE SHOULD BE IN OUR JOINT COMMUNIQUE. SUCH INCLUSION WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS CONSTITUTING U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF GEISEL'S INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (SEE HIS MEXICO PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS).

F. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

WE AGREE THAT THE KEY ISSUE IS BRAZIL'S EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS. ON THE BRAZILIAN SIDE, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES AT THIS TIME IS THE CONTINUED US INACTION ON THE AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION ISSUE FOR THE BANDEIRANTE AIRCRAFT.

(I) AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION. INTRODUCING BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE PRESIDENT COULD INDICATE SOME POSITIVE MOVE BY THE FAA, ASSUMING ACTION HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN BY THE TIME OF THE VISIT. THE ISSUE HAS CAUSED A STRONG EMOTIONAL REACTION IN BRAZILIAN AVIATION CIRCLES, QUITE OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE TO THE US (SEE BRASILIA'S 0907).

(II) EXPORT SUBSIDY SYSTEM. THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO INDICATE THAT WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM COMPENSATES FOR A HIGH (I.E., OVER-VALUED) EXCHANGE RATE, IT CAUSES US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY. IN BROACHING THIS SUBJECT, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL'S TRADE BALANCE IN 1978 IS SURROUNDED BY UNCERTAINTY. (GIVEN THIS OUTLOOK FOR THE ECONOMY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOB WILL BE UNWILLING TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM THIS YEAR. A TREASURY TEAM WILL BE DISCUSSING THE EXPORT SUBSIDY SYSTEM IN BRASILIA NEXT WEEK.)

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G. OUR ARMS TRANSFER LIMITATION POLICY

WHILE WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF OUR POLICY AND AN INQUIRY ABOUT BRAZIL'S, WE WOULD EXPECT THE GOB TO REACT NEGATIVELY TO THIS ISSUE, ARGUING THAT BRAZIL NEEDS EXPORTS TO BUILD ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND THAT ITS TRANSFERS ARE, IN ANY EVENT, INSIGNIFICANT COMPARED TO THOSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE GOB OVERTURES ON FUTURE FORMS OF US-BRAZIL MILITARY COOPERATION,

WE WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY NOR, AS THE DEPARTMENT KNOWS,
DO WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ANY AT THIS
TIME. (TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED CLEARANCE OF THIS
PARAGRAPH WITH CHAIRMAN USDEL JBUSMC)

H. REGIONAL ISSUES

WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH ANY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
SUGGESTIONS EXCEPT THE AMAZON PACT, AS NOTED IN
PARA 2 (E) ABOVE. WE SUGGEST THAT IT NOT BE RAISED
UNLESS IT IS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT
PEREZ IN CARACAS, AND THEN -- IF THE OCCASION IS
DEEMED APPROPRIATE -- ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THAT
CONVERSATION.

I. LAW OF THE SEA

WE ARE NOT YET INFORMED ON THE RECENT INTER-
SESSIONAL MEETING IN NEW YORK AND THUS HAVE NO
NEW THOUGHTS TO CONTRIBUTE IN THIS AREA AT THIS
TIME. (FOR THE GOB'S MOST RECENT STATEMENT TO US
OF ITS POSITION, SEE 77 BRASILIA 9325).
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